Abstract-Passivity is a necessary condition for a system's stability, meaning that an energy generating system may readily become unstable. Energy-aware actuation can enforce passivity by monitoring the amount of energy that is exchanged with a system, while using an allocated energy budget to execute a task. Careful communication of the energy budgets is important to prevent accidental generation of energy. Therefore, this paper proposes an energy transaction protocol to communicate energy budgets in a distributed robotic system to guarantee that passivity is kept. Simulations are performed with a model of the protocol that is applied to a simulated unreliable communication channel. It is verified that the proposed protocol keeps passivity in the system, while a naive communication strategy either violates passivity or is unnecessarily dissipative.
I. INTRODUCTION
Guaranteeing safe physical human-robot interaction (pHRI) is one of the most important criteria in the development of robotic systems. A big step towards achieving safety is to ensure that a system is unconditionally stable. It has been proved in [1] that a necessary condition to ensure stability during interaction with any environment is that the total system is passive. A system is said to be passive if its energy content is always less than or equal to the energy that has been added through a power port (an interface through which energy can be exchanged) plus the amount of energy that was initially present [2] . Passivity can be enforced in several ways [3] , [4] , [5] , among which is energy-aware actuation [6] . This type of actuation monitors the amount of energy that is injected into or extracted out of a system by an actuator. It has been shown that a high level supervisor can allocate (virtual) energy packages to lower level (actuation) controllers, and that a budgeted amount of (physical) energy can be used by the actuation system, after which task execution is halted to not violate passivity [7] .
Communication is never instantaneous and always incurs a delay on a message that has been sent. If this communication channel is part of a real-time control loop, instability can easily occur. Passivity is, again, a way to guarantee stability of a system using an unreliable communication channel with varying jitter [8] . It is also important to realize that energy in This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 688857 (SoftPro). The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the authors. The European Commission or its services cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
The authors are affiliated with the Robotics and Mechatronics group, Technical Medical Centre, University of Twente, The Netherlands, and the second author also with the Bio-mechatronics and EnergyEfficient Robotics group, ITMO University, St. Petersburg, Russia. Email: {s.s.groothuis,s.stramigioli}@utwente.nl a distributed system is composed of the energy of separate systems Σ A and Σ B , and the energy in the communication channel (E T ), as shown in Figure 1 . Its network architecture may be assumed to be fault-free. However, communicating actuation setpoints with corresponding energy budgets may be a source for the loss of passivity depending on a system's resilience to network errors like, e.g., data corruption, duplication, packet loss, and out of order delivery. If, due to network errors, an energy budget is delivered more than once and is accepted by the client as valid energy, passivity is lost since energy is generated. Also, adding energy to a client's budget without first removing it from the sender's budget will violate passivity during the transfer. Naive communication of energy budgets may also result in inefficient use of (virtual) energy to accomplish tasks. This happens, for example, if a transmitted energy package is completely dismissed after it has been lost in the network, despite the fact that the energy cannot have been injected in the system. These issues may partly be solved by choosing a network protocol capable of handling the network errors. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), for example, guarantees packet delivery in the correct order, but is not suited for real-time delivery. The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) can be used in real-time situations since it requires less overhead, but there is no guarantee of packet delivery. EtherCAT is a widely used Ethernet-based fieldbus system [9] that can be used in real-time control systems. It uses 100BASE-TX Ethernet communication and associated hardware to achieve bounded latencies, such that a certain operating frequency can be guaranteed. This is only possible with communication over cables. That means that it cannot be used in a distributed system, since it cannot make use of other communication channels like WiFi. Hence, long distance telemanipulation, or communication between multiple disjoint systems through various communication channels is not possible.
To be able to passively communicate energy budgets in a distributed robotic system, independent of the specific network architecture, a formal message transaction has to be used. An example of such a transaction mechanism is a consensus protocol. A consensus protocol [10] facilitates the reaching of agreement among agents participating in a transaction about a proposal. Therefore, all agents commit to a change of the same value. These protocols have been used in the context of distributed database systems [11] , [12] , and multi-agent robot control [13] , [14] . These consensus protocols can be employed whenever many separate agents need to agree on a proposal done by a coordinator. In a distributed robotic system with energy budgets being communicated for separate actuation systems, there is no consensus on energy since it will be different for each actuation system. Therefore, this paper proposes an energy allocation transaction protocol for proper book-keeping of communicated energy budgets for ensuring passivity of a system. The protocol consists of two state machines: one for the supervisor, and one for the client to which energy is to be allocated. These state machines define a sequential procedure followed by the supervisor and client such that the system remains passive after a transaction of energy budgets is complete, making the protocol independent of the specific network architecture.
This paper continues with a treatment on the closely related financial transactions and their similarity with energy budget transactions in Section II. The Energy Transaction Protocol is elaborated in Section III. A case study showing the workings of the proposed protocol through simulations with a model is presented in Section IV, while the results are discussed in Section V. The paper concludes with Section VI.
II. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
The notion of passivity also holds for the transfer of money between accounts, which is similar to the communication of energy while keeping the total energy in the system constant.
A. Passivity of financial transactions
Suppose e1 needs to be transfered from account A to account B, with each account having a positive balance of e10. The total amount of money is e20. During the transfer (ignoring transfer fees), e1 should be deducted from the balance of account A, resulting in e9, and be added to the balance of account B, resulting in e11. The total amount is still e20, meaning the "system" is passive. If e1 would be deducted from account A, but along the way the message to increase the balance of account B is lost, the total amount would be e19. This is still a passive system, and more precisely a dissipative system, but this is clearly not acceptable. If the balance of account B first increases to e11 after which the message to deduct e1 from account A is lost, the total amount of money in the accounts would be e21. Although quite beneficial for the account holders (where one of them has received the money without the other losing money), money generation by a transfer of funds is not desired for economic reasons. The system is then not passive (or even dissipative), but actually active (generative).
B. Transaction properties
Besides the forming of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to standardize the interbanking messaging network [15] , various protocols to facilitate money transfers have been developed [16] , [17] , [18] , including protocols that implement ACID transactions [19] . ACID transaction properties, which stands for Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and Durability, can be used to ensure valid transactions, which is a paradigm originating from data manipulation in databases [20] , [21] . Atomicity is the property that operations are indivisible and irreducible, and that either all or none occur. Consistency means that a consistent valid state of the system should be kept, so, for instance, that cells in a database will have the correct datatype. Isolation means that a concurrent execution of operations on a single entity are treated as a sequential execution, i.e., partial effects of one transaction are not visible by another transaction. Durability means that a transaction is only successful if it cannot be changed by external influences anymore, e.g., a power loss.
C. Energy transactions in this context
The ACID properties can be placed in the context of energy transactions. Atomicity can be translated as the property that energy cannot be "given" without it also being subtracted somewhere, i.e., one action is coupled to the other. It will later be seen that, in case of uncertainty, energy may be subtracted while it has not actually been "given". Consistency can be interpreted as the property that the total energy contents in the system should ideally be constant after the transaction. Isolation is achieved when partial effects of an energy transaction, e.g., receiving a new energy budget, are not visible to another transaction, i.e., concurrent transactions are to be treated as sequential transactions. An exception is that when a transaction has started, the energy it wants to communicate should be reserved and be made inaccessible to other transactions, otherwise energy could be generated. Durability is achieved when local energy budgets cannot be changed by some influence after a transaction is final. A power loss, as considered before, is less applicable here since a robotic system would then be reinitialized.
III. ENERGY TRANSACTION PROTOCOL

A. General principle
The proposed transaction protocol in a distributed robotic system to communicate allocated energy budgets is shown in Figure 2 . It is assumed that a supervisor communicates with multiple (j) clients through communication channels. The supervisor has a usable budget and a transaction budget. The usable budget is the energy that the supervisor can allocate to clients. The transaction budget is the reserved energy that is intended as a client's allocated energy, i.e., the transaction intention. Therefore, that part of the budget is unusable for transactions with other clients. On the client side a similar distinction between the usable budget and transaction budget is made. The usable budget is a client's energy budget that can be used by the local actuation control system to perform a task. The transaction budget is merely the budget that the supervisor intends as new usable budget for the client. The amount of "energy" in the transaction budget can only be used after the supervisor's intention has been committed in the client and the content has been transfered to the client's usable budget, where it becomes usable energy. In this implementation, energy cannot be transfered from one transaction supervisor budget (corresponding to a client) to another (corresponding to another client). The supervisor's transaction budget needs to be deposited back in the usable budget before it can be reallocated. The energy content of the supervisor is the sum of the usable and transaction budgets, while the energy in the client is only the usable budget.
B. Transaction protocol
The protocol state machine diagram of the supervisor is shown in Figure 3 , while the protocol state machine diagram of a client (of which there can be many) is shown in Figure 4 .
An intention is initiated by the supervisor, by transmitting an intended budget to the appropriate client. The client waits until it receives a new intention and, when it does, it sends an acknowledge. If the supervisor receives an acknowledge which does not correspond to the most recent transmitted intention, it defines a new intention and transmits that to the client. If the supervisor did receive the correct acknowledge, it either commits or aborts the transaction, which, in the nominal situation without timeouts and lost messages, is properly received and executed by the client. A confirmation of the action is sent by the client, after which the supervisor may execute a post-commit or post-abort process, and send an acknowledge to the client to indicate that the transaction is complete (although this last step is not strictly necessary). Post-commit processing in the supervisor includes updating the usable and unusable budgets. Post-abort processing includes redepositing the supervisor's transaction budget into the usable budget for reallocation. The communication channel is then used five times per transaction (or four times, if the last acknowledge is not implemented).
It is assumed that both the supervisor and the client have a mechanism to keep track of the time that has passed. Timeouts can be triggered for messages arriving too late and messages that are lost. When a transaction intention has been transmitted, the supervisor can timeout when waiting for an acknowledge. It will then define a new intention and transmit it to the client. If the client's acknowledge has been received by the supervisor, but the supervisor's commit or abort command is never received by the client (causing the client to timeout), the client commits the intention, sends a commit acknowledgement, and waits for the supervisor to send a new command. Proceeding with committing an intention after a timeout ensures that the budget that was initially intended is indeed allocated, meaning that the client can use that energy to perform its task, thereby not limiting task execution further. If, on the other hand, the timeout results in reinitializing a transaction without the successful delivery of a new energy budget to be used by the client, the performance of the complete system may suffer due to inappropriate budgeting at that time. The supervisor has to transmit a status request (number n = 1) to the client to verify what the client has done since the last communicated message. After a properly received status report (Intention committed), the supervisor can continue with post-commit processing and complete the transaction. If the status report is not received by the supervisor (or, similarly, the status request is not received by the client), the supervisor may again transmit a status request (n = 2). After N timeouts the supervisor has to assume, by a passivity timeout, that the client has committed the proposed transaction intention, for passivity to be kept. The parameter N can be chosen according to latency specifications and the amount of certainty one requires in that a transaction has been completed in a valid way, instead of assuming that an intention had been committed and risking unnecessary dissipation if it had not been committed. If no status requests were received by the client within the time associated to N supervisor timeouts, it will assume that the transaction is complete by Timeout N and that the supervisor knows how to handle the situation unilaterally.
Another scenario is that the acknowledgement of a new intention is sent from the client to the supervisor, but that acknowledgement is never received by the supervisor and a newly generated intention, due to a supervisor timeout, is in turn never received by the client. Then the client commits the intention due to a timeout, acknowledges its action, and waits for a supervisor command. If the supervisor has transmitted yet another new intention, the client understands that the timeout-commit should not have been done, resulting in a roll back and the treatment of a new intention.
A protocol may be resilient in case of supervisor or client failures and may still successfully accomplish a transaction [22] . Here, the concern is that passivity may be lost which can endanger the stability of the system. When a transaction is committed at the client the transaction budget is relocated to the usable budget. The supervisor's and client's usable budget then add up to the initial energy level in the supervisor's usable budget that was present before the transaction. Therefore, passivity regarding the usable energy is never lost. One may incorrectly consider the traveling energy to be a source for the loss of passivity, because when an intention has been committed to a client's usable budget the transaction intention energy is still present in the supervisor's transaction budget. However, one needs to consider a complete transaction after which this state will have been resolved. Moreover, the usable budgets may be implemented in non-volatile memory, while the transaction budgets should be implemented in volatile memory. A power loss will then cause the transaction budgets to reset and be empty, meaning that that energy cannot be reused for new transactions. This may cause additional dissipation, but always guarantees passivity. After a transaction, the client can return the energy that was not used since the last received energy budget, but not doing so does not violate passivity.
IV. SIMULATION CASE STUDY
A model of the energy transaction protocol has been made in MATLAB and Simulink, to perform simulations to verify the validity of the protocol and its effectiveness in keeping passivity while communicating energy budgets ( Figure 5) .
The state machines of Figure 3 and Figure 4 are implemented using Stateflow charts, and Simevents is used to model event-driven message generation (transaction intentions, command messages, etc.) and message transmission over a communication channel. The communication channel is modeled to unreliably transmit messages with varying communication delays. For illustration purposes and to prevent intractable simulated behavior, the delay is set to Δτ = 1 + rand( 0.5, 0.5) seconds, where rand() generates a random number between its arguments. This random delay is renewed for each new message that is transmitted. The timeouts in the state machines are set to 1 second, which means that an on time and too late message arrival becomes equally likely. In the latter case, a timeout is triggered after which the state machine handles the timeout actions. The supervisor and client sample the incoming message queue once a second. Interrupts to allow immediate processing of incoming messages has not been implemented, but can be incorporated straight-forwardly. The number of status requests and failed status responses has been set to N = 1. A multitransaction simulation with the proposed protocol is done, in which a new transaction is started after the previous transaction has completed. The supervisor's decision to commit or abort a transaction has been randomized. The energy budgets are initialized such that the usable supervisor budget is at 10 Joule, while all other budgets are at 0 Joule. The result of the simulation can be seen in Figure 6 , showing the communication procedure, and Figure 7 , showing the individual energy budget levels. According to Figure 6 , timeouts (grey lines) are frequently causing intentions (cross markers) to be redefined and retransmitted. If an intention is received on the client side (cross marker), an acknowledgement is sent (circular marker) and may or may not be received by the supervisor (circular marker). The supervisor (randomly) chooses to commit (green line) or abort (red line) Figure 7 , the total energy level of the usable budgets is always smaller than or equal to the initial energy in the system (10 Joule), i.e., the transactions ensure a passive system. The energy decrease is caused by the client's returning energy not arriving at the supervisor due to the unreliable communication channel. At 20.5 seconds, however, the returned energy is received by the supervisor and is stored in the usable energy budget. When a more naive communication strategy is followed using the same communication channel and identical sequential intentions and corresponding timeout moments, the energy budgets of the supervisor, client, and their sum will change. Because there is less overhead in this situation, the simulation time has been decreased to obtain the same number of communicated transaction intentions as with the transaction protocol in effect. When the supervisor is "naively optimistic", Figure 8 shows that the system remains passive, but that it has become much more dissipative. The supervisor assumes messages arrive and are acted upon, and because there is no two-way agreement whether energy has arrived, all intentions done by the supervisor are immediately and irreversibly subtracted from the supervisor budget. A similar situation holds for a "naively pessimistic" communicating supervisor, which considers unacknowledged energy intentions as having not arrived at the client, as shown in Figure 9 . The supervisor's transaction budget is added to the usable budget, but energy may still be returned by the client, which possibly generates energy (for example at 8 seconds).
V. DISCUSSION
This paper proposes a passive transaction protocol for communicating energy budgets. It can guarantee passivity even when using a highly unreliable communication channel. It has been shown that a system becomes more dissipative or even generative if the protocol is not used and a more naive way of communicating energy budgets is employed instead.
The simulations that were done are quite extreme in the sense that the communication channel is highly unreliable. In real setups the connected components will likely share a more reliable network, thereby often allowing the supervisor and client to communicate in the nominal way as elaborated in Section III. The point is that it is important to keep track of energy budgets that are communicated throughout the system, which the protocol has shown to be able to do.
Using the proposed transaction protocol, which ensures system passivity, inevitably introduces a higher latency when compared to "sending and forgetting", which cannot ensure passivity, because of the overhead to confirm actions. At least two round-trips over the communication channel are required to communicate intentions and to complete a transaction. It depends on the hardware and communication channel properties what real-time frequencies can be achieved.
For accurate verification of the workings of the protocol, this preliminary study should be advanced and tested on a 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper an energy transaction protocol has been presented that is able to communicate energy budgets in unreliable communication networks while keeping a system's passivity. Inspiration has been found in financial transactions which are similar to energy budget transactions. A model of the protocol consisting of a supervisor, that initiates a transaction intention, a client, and a communication channel has been presented, and simulations have shown that the protocol is able to maintain passivity in the system. Without using the protocol, dissipation in the system increases and generation of energy may even occur. The protocol should be further investigated for accurate verification of its effectiveness.
